Stratification:

This discourse arises from a necessary need to understand what Anton LaVey meant by stratification. It's very apparent that many members of the Satanic community have no idea what that term means. Since a perusal of Anton LaVey's writings, complete with his own statements, reveals that he derived most of his ideas from Nietzsche and Ayn Rand, it makes sense that understanding stratification will therefore be best endeavored by appealing to those two writers, and the people from whom they derived ideas. To highlight the type of oft-repeated misunderstandings from those who do not study philosophy, we look at the FAQ of the First Church of Satan:

"When individuality is crushed it is tyranny, no matter what label you affix to it; stratification, ethnic cleansing or holy war. The despot will profess he is enforcing the will of God or the mandate of Satan! 

Anton LaVey did the cause of Satanism a grave disservice when he advocated stratification, calling for layers of hierarchal authority within the ranks of his organization. "

Yet, above this, the FAQ states that:

'we say, let's level the playing field, and then see who can "produce the goods."  Going around with your nose in the air while claiming, without proof or justification, that you are better than everyone else, is the mark of people who in reality consider themselves inferior.'

Unless there is an a priori, (means "without prior experience"), basis that ranks are automatic proof of someone being inferior, this argument is nonsensical. You can't say that people are better than others based upon justification, then decry ranks which show that justification in a recognizable fashion. These kinds of tautological arguments are the kind frequently heard by those who don't study philosophy, and don't try to understand what the author is trying to say. To understand stratification, we must start at the place where philosophy really began in the West, (even though there were philosophers of Western Civilisation prior to this), with Socrates.

Platonic/Socratic Discourse on Thymotic Relationships.

Socrates, (via Plato), introduces us to three specific portions of the soul; those being Appetite or Desire, Thymos or Recognition, and Reason. These three specific portions of our soul form the tripartite soul, of which, depending upon what type of person you are, are combined in certain portions.

Aristotle wrote that all humans are motivated by a desire to know in his Metaphysics. While this may or may not be true, it has caveats to it. The desire to know is a form of Eros, and Eros, (where we get "erotic" from, in this sense, it's being used to talk about an obsessive love for something), seeks to acquire more through expansion of its desires. It binds together increasing amounts of the objects of desire, or else the same objects of desire into a more dominant state of possession. Because of this, you can have seperate types of Erotic individuals, such as the Tyrant and the Sage/Philosopher.

Both of these two erotic individuals never stop wanting more of what they have in the realm of possessions. Socrates said that his quest for truth caused him to constantly annoy people, because he had an erotic thirst for more knowledge. Socrates says of his dilemma:

'Perhaps someone may say, "But surely, Socrates, after you have left us you can spend the rest of your life quietly minding your own business." This is the hardest thing of all to make some of you understand. If I say I cannot "mind my own business," you will not believe that I am serious. If on the other hand I tell you that to let no day pass without discussing goodness and all the other subjects about which you hear me talking and that examining both myself and others is really the very best thing a man can do and that life without this sort of examination is not worth living, you will be even less inclined to believe me. Nevertheless, gentlemen, that is how it is."'

The philosopher is driven not so much by the actual acquisition of truth as it is the sight of truth, feeling that he/she has gone into the right direction of that pursuit. Socrates had such an intense Eros for knowledge that he died for it, as have many scientists and philosophers after him in repressive regimes. The tyrant is seeking an Erotic desire to overcome his Megalothymotic Desire, (lumping together both thymos and desire). The two are never cleared of this Eros, it does not transcend itself.

.There is a careful distinction which here needs to be made. John Ralston Saul criticizes this approach in "Unconscious Civilisation" deriding Jung's description of the complex free ego as being "an impregnable position, the steadfastness of a superman or the sublimity of a perfect sage. Both figures are ideal images. Napoleon on the one hand, Lao-Tzu on the other." Saul criticizes this on the basis of lumping this together with Thomas Carlyle in the nineteenth century, who used this type of grouping the sage and the tyrant to provide anti-democratic intellectual arguments. Quantitively, they are both possessed by a desire for more, however, the nature of what they desire is different, so that the distinction stands firm.

Plato's Socrates, when discussing the parts of our soul, labels that each part seeks its own good. Our Desire seeks food, drink, and sex; our Thymos seeks victory, achievement, and recognition, while our Reason seeks knowledge and to rule the shortsightedness of our Desire, and the mastery of the blind ambition of our Thymos. If reason rules as our supremity, then this can happen and we will be justly rewarded. Mastery of all these things will cause justice towards others. We may note that Nietzsche objected to this on very different grounds, but we'll return to that problem later.

The nature of spiritedness/Thymos is a bit ambiguous in Plato/Socrates ideas. To think psychologically, Desire is akin to Id; Thymos akin to Ego, and Reason akin to the Superego. Yet, the Thymotic portion of the soul sometimes takes on superego proportions, helping to curb the appetite, but not merely to gain more satisfaction, as in the case of the Ego.

"Don't we notice that, when desires force someone contrary to the calculating part, he reproaches himself and *his spirit is roused against that in him which is doing the forcing; and, just as though there were two parties at faction, such a man's spirit becomes the ally of speech?* But as for its making common cause with the desires to do what speech has declared must not be done, I'd suppose you'd say you had never noticed anything of the kind happening in yourself, nor, I suppose, in anyone else" (Book IV of the Republic, 440a-b, Emphasis is mine).

Plato derived his ideas on the spirited portion of the soul from Homeric accounts, as an explanation as to why chieftains and warriors risked death in combat. What they are seeking is not necessarily something physical and tangible, for certainly soldiers don't receive the rewards of their battles, but they are instead seeking recognition for being great warriors, from others whom they feel equal to as warriors. It is seeking something which is more abstract than tangible physical goals. What it wants is recongition for achievements, it wants victory, it wants to achieve a goal for the sake of achieving a goal, to correct a wrong merely because it was *wrong*, not because that wrong inflicted any real injury. (Note these things because it refutes an argument from Keith Windschuttle.)

When working together with reason, the spirited portion of the soul has great power, its drive multiplied by the power of logic make it a useful ally in deterring raw passion from overwhelming us. Yet, what determines a good form of Thymos as opposed to reckless struggles for desire? Plato believed that the bad form of Thymos is caused by corruption of bad rearing. Judging from the setting of the Republic, the bad rearing was the rule and not the exception. Thus, someone can become a tyrant instead of a philosopher or great architect because their Thymos is employed to lawless desires through corrupted upbringing, and may run lose of its own, subcoming to neither Reason or Desire, but merely instead to a whimsical interpretation of self-respect. Mark MacYoung discusses a case where a MacDonald employee was killed by a man who felt slighted because his order was not done right. This wasn't a case where the man's appetite was being hurt, but rather, he felt a Thymotic form of Narcissistic injury, the burger was irrelevant, it was the principle of him getting the order wrong that made him feel that the employee viewed him as being inferior.

Going to book 9, Socrates informs us that each of our tripartite soul has its desires, and Thymos desires victory and honor. (Note this again). The pursuit of victory and honor may not be consistent with each other, defending honor may result in a loss of victory, so that the lesser of two evils will have to be sorted out. Someone suffering from an overly Thymotic disposition will undoubtedly defend honor over victory, as Reason would curb the desire to fight without winning a victory.

Spiritedness is the passion by which order, justice, patriotism, valor, heroism, compassion, and so forth arise. Thymos looks for mastery through any avenue. Each of these spirited passions brings forth equal negative counterparts. Order arises from mutual recognition of each other (isothymia), but someone with a megalothymotic desire will seek to destroy the mutual form of order to supplant it with his/her own form of order that is believed to be superior. The problem that Socrates sees with the Thymotic person is that Thymos sides with whatever side represents the Ego best, whether or not it is true. You can see this in academic fields with the popularity of Afrocentricism or Indocentricism, movements where the influence of other cultures is minimized to assert the superiority of one group. Socrates shows through Leontius that one gets angry when someone threatens their Thymos, and gets angry at him/herself for trespassing on others Thymos as well. This is what has allowed the flourishment of Afrocentricism and Indocentricism, other people see it as being shameful to threaten someone else's Thymos, and we have seen that Thymos sides with the ego, not the dispassionate search for truth which Philosophy seeks.

The primary interpretator of Hegel is Kojeve, who notes another problem with the Thymotic individual. To Kojeve, (he departs from Hegel here), human desire is at its core, the desire of another object and not another thing. This is seperate from animal desire, which actually wants the object and not an abstract thing. Animal desire wants a woman's body, Human desire wants her love and mutual recognition of that love. The problem is that this leads to abstract thinking that is not noble. For example, most of us men who are single notice that when we are not dating anyone, women seem to be more indifferent to us than when we are in a relationship. The reason being that women want something because the other woman has it, it is an abstract attraction to a concrete thing, they want superiority over another woman rather than the man himself. To Kojeve, such things were not better than animal desires.

Animals are always in states of danger where they fight over a tangible product, typically the sex offered by mates from being an alpha male. Kojeve doesn't see that risk itself is enough to be concluded as a form of human desire, rather, it is the decision that death is better than life without (X), and (X) is an abstract thing. This also includes the very thrill of hunting itself, in which an abstract thing is sought after instead of the concrete.

Thymotic Misconceptions:

The reason why I discussed the above is because one of the flaws of Francis Fukuyama's book, "End of History and the Last Man", is that it uses a lot of Nietzsche, Hegel, and Kojeve to explain the soul, but very little Plato/Socrates to do so. This is apparent from the criticism that Keith Windscuttle uses against Francis Fukuyama. Let me illustrate.

"One of the most difficult of all things to endure for a crow, a raven, a wolf, or a human is to feel alone and separated from one's own kind. A sense of belonging is one of the most universal of all feelings."

Lawrence Kilham, quoted in Candace Savage, Bird Brains: The Intelligence of Crows, Ravens, Magpies, and Jays, p. 61

So, what marks the difference between humans and animals, if we are by very nature social with each other? The answer on pp. 146-147 of Francis Fukuyama's book is that:

'Hegel's "first man" shares with the animals certain basic natural desires, such as the desire for food, for sleep, for shelter, and above all for the preservation of his own life. He is, to this extent, part of the natural or physical world. But Hegel's "first man" is radically different from the animals in that he desires not only real, "positive" objects -- a steak, or fur jacket with which to keep warm, or a shelter in which to live -- but also objects that are totally non-material. Above all, he desires the desire of other men, that is, to be wanted by others or to be recognized. Indeed, for Hegel, an individual could not become self-conscious, that is, become aware of himself as a seperate human being, without being recognized by other human beings. Man, in other words, was from the start a social being: his own sense of self-worth and identity is intimately connected with the value that other people place on him. He is, in David Riesman's phrase, fundamentally "other directed". While aniamls exhibit social behavior, this behavior is instinctual and is based on the mutual satisfaction of natural needs. A dolphin or a monkey desire a fish or banana, not the desire of another dolphin or monkey. As Kojeve explains, only a man can desire "an object perfectly useless from the biological point of view (such as a medal, or the enemy's flag)"; he desires such objects not for themselves but because they are desired by other human beings.'

I feel Fukuyama's brief treatment, (even as good as it was), of Socrates/Plato's dialogue was what causes the confusion. After summarizing a viewpoint of Socrates, Fukuyama hits us with this caveat, on p. 165:

'Thymos and the "desire for recognition" differ somewhat insofar as the former refers to a part of the soul that invests objects with value, whereas the latter is an activity of thymos that demands that another consciousness share the same valuation. It is possible for one to feel thymotic pride in oneself without demanding recognition.'

In countering this claim, Keith Windschuttle writes in "The Killing of History", p. 192, that:

'While it is true that the cultivators often fought one another to gain the fruits of territory and to capture and subjugate peoples, the have-nots from the waste lands beyond the fertile zones usually had other motives. The Huns, Mongols and Tartars from the Asian steppes, who periodically ravaged the cultivated lands of Europe, China and India between the fifth and the fifteenth centuries, sought neither land, nor slaves, nor recognition. Keegan explains the motives of these 'horse-peoples':

"They did not seek, as the Goths did, to inherit or adapt to the half-understood civilisations they invaded. Nor -- despite a suggestion that Attila contemplated marriage with the daughter of the western Roman emperor -- did they seek to supplant others' political authority with their own. They wanted the spoils of war without strings. They were warriors for war's sake, for the loot it brought, the risks, the thrills, the animal satisfactions of triumph....."'

Prof. Windschuttle misunderstands the nature of Thymos, which is understandable. The primary dedication of Prof. Fukuyama's book is that recognition drives the nature of humans, and he does so while only making marginal comments about Thymos itself, which he notes is seperate from self-recognition. To feel the "thrills" and "animal satisfactions" are both thymotic desires, which is the formula that Socrates gave for the Tyrant. (One part thirst or desire, one part Thymos or spiritedness.)

The main thesis of Fukuyama's book is that a system, which is liberal democracy, has invented the greatest ideal. Even if the specific system operating under it is flawed, liberal democracy's ideal, of having everyone's vote count, satisfies the most number of desires and cannot fundementally be improved upon, hence, the end of history. While Prof. Windschuttle is correct to chide Prof. Fukuyama for a monocausitive look at history, the true test would be to see if a system better than liberal democracy could be invented. This point is being illustrated because many people make the same mistake that Prof. Windschuttle does, (and which Prof. Fukuyama comes very close to doing himself), and giving Thymos a narrow interpretation.

The Creation of the System:

Verily, men have given unto themselves all their good and bad. Verily, they took it not, they found it not, it came not unto them as a voice from heaven. Values did man only assign to things in order to maintain himself- he created only the significance of things, a human significance! Therefore, calleth he himself "man," that is, the valuator. Valuing is creating: hear it, ye creating ones! Valuation itself is the treasure and jewel of the valued things. Through valuation only is there value; and without valuation the nut of existence would be hollow. Hear it, ye creating ones! Change of values- that is, change of the creating ones. Always doth he destroy who hath to be a creator.' Nietzsche, "Thus Spake Zarathustra"

What values are created are not what matters to Nietzsche, for there were "a thousand and one goals" which men followed. Each of these people had their own "language of good and evil", which was not intelligible to its neighbors. Rather what mattered was that the "beast with red cheeks" held these beliefs to be good. Nietzsche contrasted cultures with the Vikings and remarked how proud the Vikings were. The Master Morality for Nietzsche was saying "I am the greatest there is!", and holding ones own way of life was. In contrast, Nietzsche tells us:

'There is nothing very odd about lambs disliking birds of prey, but this is no reason for holding it against large birds of prey that they carry off lambs. And when the lambs whisper among themselves, "These birds of prety are evil, and does not this give us a right to say that whatever is the opposite of a bird of prey must be good?" there is nothing intrinsically wrong with such an argument -- though the birds of prey will look somewhat quizzically and say, "We have nothing against these good lambs; in fact, we love them; nothing tastes better than a tender lamb." -- to expect that strength will not manifest itself as strength, as the desire to overcome, to appropriate, to have enemies, obsctacles, and triumphs, is every bit as absurd as to expect that weakness will manifest itself as strength.'

In his unpublished writings, "Will to Power", he writes that: 'The lower species ("herd," "mass," "society") unlearns modesty and blows up its needs into cosmic and metaphysical values. In this way the whole of existence is vulgarized: in so far as the mass is dominant it bullies the exceptions, so they lose their faith in themselves and become nihilists' this leads itself to the 'Decline and insecurity of all higher types' and a 'Pity for the lowly and suffering as a measure for the height of a soul.....' so that 'only the most mediocre, who have no feeling at all for this conflict, flourish while the higher kind miscarries and, as a product of degeneration, invites antipathy—that the mediocre on the other hand, when they pose as the goal and meaning, arouse indignation (that nobody is able any more to answer any "for what?"' Because of this, 'Those poor in life, the weak, impoverish life; those rich in life, the strong, enrich it. The first are parasites of life; the second give presents to it.'

Even Nietzsche's critique of modern science is misunderstood. Postmodernists use Nietzsche's critique of science to mean that science is inherently inegaliterian. This is strange to come from the man who was the biggest scoffer of egaliterianism. One needs to look no further than Nietzsche himself to solve this contradiction. Nietzsche writes that when physicists speak of "nature's conformity to law," it is not a "matter of fact... but rather only a naively humanitarian emendation and perversion of meaning, with which you make abundant concessions to the democratic instincts of the modern soul!" (Beyond Good and Evil, all quotes from hereout are from here, until annotated further). Nietzsche's critique is that science is too democratic, not vice versa.

In explaining this, Nietzsche goes on:

'The scholar's declaration of independence, his emancipation from philosophy, is one of the more refined effects of the democratic order--and disorder: the self-glorification and self-exaltation of scholars now stand in full bloom, in their finest spring, everywhere--which is not meant to imply that in this case self-praise smells pleasant. "Freedom from all masters!" that is what the instinct of the rabble wants in this case, too; and after science has most happily rid itself of theology whose "handmaid" it was for too long, it aims with an excess of high spirits and a lack of understanding to lay down laws for philosophy and to play the "master" herself--what am I saying? the philosopher.' Nietzsche considers the true philosophers to be those who disregard scientists and scholars nad be "commanders and legislators," for whom the "will to truth" is the "will to power." To Nietzsche, the philosophers virtue is that he is by nature a master.

'In contrast with the philosopher, Nietzsche finds that the scholar tries to destroy the great men, to bring them down a level, as the scholar depends upon public support and criticism, and the herd wants to have egaliterianism, not superiority. Thus, while the scholar may expose real flaws in the great men of a country, he does so not out of kindness, but out of bias. "The worst and most dangerous thing of which scholars are capable comes from their sense of the mediocrity of their own type--from that Jesuitism of mediocrity which instinctively works at the annihilation of the uncommon man and tries to break every bent bow or, preferably, to unbend it. Unbending--considerately, of course, with a solicitous hand--unbending with familiar pity, that is the characteristic art of Jesuitism which has always known how to introduce itself as a religion of pity." The scholar wants to impose herd/slave values and morality upon the masses, after all, the history of mankind is the history of the working slave, who uses his work as his means of appreciation and obtaining recognition. Thus the scholar, seeking to please the masses, wants to write as they will see fit in his books.

What happens once slave values have totally overridden society is given in "Thus Spake Zarathustra":

'Alas! there cometh the time when man will no longer launch the arrow of his longing beyond man- and the string of his bow will have unlearned to whizz! I tell you: one must still have chaos in one, to give birth to a dancing star. I tell you: ye have still chaos in you. Alas! There cometh the time when man will no longer give birth to any star. Alas! There cometh the time of the most despicable man, who can no longer despise himself. Lo! I show you the last man.... One still worketh, for work is a pastime. But one is careful lest the pastime should hurt one. One no longer becometh poor or rich; both are too burdensome. Who still wanteth to rule? Who still wanteth to obey? Both are too burdensome. No shepherd, and one herd! Everyone wanteth the same; everyone is equal: he who hath other sentiments goeth voluntarily into the madhouse. "Formerly all the world was insane,"- say the subtlest of them, and blink thereby.'

Nietzsche then gives a curious story where a rope-walker walks across a rope between two towers, where he gets halfway across when a rival rope-walker goes after him. The rival yells and jumps over the first, who plunges down besides Zarathustra. When asked about the meaning of his life, and if it was honorable, Zarathustra replied, "thou hast made danger thy calling; therein there is nothing contemptible. Now thou perishest by thy calling: therefore will I bury thee with mine own hands."

The risk for thymos is seen as noble, even if there are those better at it, but when "everyone is equal" no such thing will be done. The want or the Will to Achieve is totally gone, there will be nothing but mediocrity, as anything more is too much. To get rid of this, there will be a battle: 'Its last Lord it here seeketh: hostile will it be to him, and to its last God; for victory will it struggle with the great dragon. What is the great dragon which the spirit is no longer inclined to call Lord and God? "Thou-shalt," is the great dragon called. But the spirit of the lion saith, "I will." "Thou-shalt," lieth in its path, sparkling with gold- a scale-covered beast; and on every scale glittereth golden, "Thou shalt!" The values of a thousand years glitter on those scales, and thus speaketh the mightiest of all dragons: "All the values of things- glitter on me. All values have already been created, and all created values- do I represent. Verily, there shall be no 'I will' any more. Thus speaketh the dragon. My brethren, wherefore is there need of the lion in the spirit? Why sufficeth not the beast of burden, which renounceth and is reverent? To create new values- that, even the lion cannot yet accomplish: but to create itself freedom for new creating- that can the might of the lion do. To create itself freedom, and give a holy Nay even unto duty: for that, my brethren, there is need of the lion. To assume the ride to new values- that is the most formidable assumption for a load-bearing and reverent spirit. Verily, unto such a spirit it is preying, and the work of a beast of prey.'

While Nietzsche goes too far in his anti-democratic writings, he does hit upon a central point that the destruction of a society can be pinpointed at the time the belief that everyone is equal comes into play. Because to declare everyone is equal is to fight against nature itself, and that is always a losing battle. To declare that beliefs are only valid on the individual basis is to destroy any accomplishments of an individual's achievement. The human seeks thymotic recognition for his/her efforts, and instead is only rewarded with the idea that he/she is just another equal. If everyone is equal regardless of what they do, then what is the point in trying? Let us now look at equalities and inequalities in a new light.

The valueless Society:

The only thing which holds a society together is the ability of it to withstand criticism. Criticism is the guiding hand that forces a society down the proper course. To put a quote to it, Friedrich Nicolai says that, "Criticism is the only helpmate we have which, while disclosing our inadequacies, can at the same time awake us to the desire for greater improvement." Yet in our valueless society, our society of dredge, the belief that everyone deserves equal means that it is improper to harm someone's thymos. Thymos, as we have seen, is harmed when what one believes and values is criticized by others.

Not only is our social criticism destroyed, but our personal criticism as well. Carl Jung writes that "Most people confuse 'self-knowledge with knowledge of their conscious ego-personalities... What is commonly called 'self-knowledge' is therefore a very limited knowledge... Since it is universally believed that man is merely what his unconsciousness knows of itself, he regards himself as harmless, and so adds stupidity to his iniquity." Yet, according to Hegel, our self-consciousness arises from the point at which someone recognizes us, or in a sense, when we develop thymotic recognition for each other.

Aelred of Rievaulx asked: "How much does a man know, if he does not know himself?" Likewise, the same rhetorical question was asked by John of Salisbury, "Who is more contemptible than he who scorns knowledge of himself?" Having lost any sense of himself in the World, our man of dredge now only does what Mussolini said so long ago: The crowd doesn't have to know, it must believe... If only we can give them faith that mountains can be moved, they will accept the illusion that mountains are moveable, and thus an illusion may become reality." Remember that our Mussolini running society can't be criticized, it's wrong to destroy his thymotic despotism, and we can't criticize the people for being pulled by his emotional tricks, it's wrong to hurt their thymotic senses, and we further can't criticize the society which breeds forth this problem, as that's all relative as the people who make it up anyway.

Emile Durkheim wrote that real information is too complex for people, so that 'It can only become a public possession through the circulation of symbols which, because they are "simple, definite, and easily representable," render intelligible a truth which, "owing to its dimensions, the number of its parts, and the complexity of their arrangement, is difficult to hold in mind.' Our herd-like society, now being run by a dictator, can be easily led about by the circulation of symbols and slogans, for each complex problem there is a simple, and wrong, solution to it. But we are not allowed to say a criticizing word, after all, while people are being butchered, let's not hurt the pride of those doing the slaughtering.

The big question is, "Does this happen in our current times?" Certainly. Like Nietzsche before warned, our society now wants to believe that it can promote equality of all. Yet there are words of warning:

"A society that puts equality -- in the sense of equality of outcome -- ahead of freedom will end up with neither equality nor freedom. The use of force to achieve equality will destroy freedom, and the force, introduced for good purposes, will end up in the hands of people who use it to promote their own interests." (1)

Is it possible to actually achieve a level of freedom, equality, and justice? I shall examine this problem, which is more complex than the initial title may seem to convey.

The notion of equality is one of the central problems in this equation. It's best explained by John Rawls, or at least, what I'm going against is John Rawls' version of justice. He distinguished from "fair" equality to merely "formal" equality. In "formal" equality, it ostensibly seems that all the same rules and standards are applied to everyone equally, but they are truly not so. In the quotable words of Anatole France:

"The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread."

Rawls believes that specific intervention is necessary in order for equalization of the playing field between people who do not have equal opportunities. The way Rawls puts it is that "undeserved inequalities call for redress." To use an easy analogy, imagine a boxing match between two competitors. Both were about the same height, same weight, same reach, and were fighting under the exact same set of rules, neither could kick each other, elbow, headbutt, bite, etc. This seems to be a fair match.

Someone arguing under Rawls' definition would say that it really isn't so. The fighter in the blue corner is 18, and has no professional fights under his belt, the other fighter is 29, with a professional record of 19-0. Even though the external circumstances would dictate this is a fair fight, anyone knows that a professional fighter with years more experience is not playing on an equal field.

Let's continue this by putting it another way. I'm never going to be as smart as Albert Einstein, or as good a fighter as Tito Ortiz. I'm never going to hit home-runs like Mark McGuire, and I'm not going to be able to play golf like Tiger Woods. Moving away from an individual perspective and into a social perspective, you could say that Americans will never know as much about camels as the Bedouins will, and the Bedouins will never know as much about industrialization as Americans do.

Arguing from the Rawls perspective, these are unequalities which deserve redress. Since it's impossible to bump me up to the level of Tiger Woods, we should seek to penaltize Tiger Woods for his athletic prowess, by giving him bad clubs, bad golf balls, and by making him wear weight bracelets on his wrists to make his swing worse. They don't want to equalize the opportunity, but instead, the actual results which will come about. What proponents of this theory are really after is not equality, or even justice, but instead, a crusade. Thomas Sowell, a genius I've only recently discovered, (2) makes a good distinction between a crusade and a policy. The difference between a policy and a crusade is that a policy is intended to have some effect on the world, while a crusade serves primarily to placate the consciences of its constituents.

They are not correcting the problems with society, or with individuals, but instead, they are trying to correct the mistakes of the universe. What they consider to be "social justice" is really just "cosmological justice", because the faults they find are more than any society could ever be casually responsible for in any sense. They don't want to correct the problems which man has caused, but the oversights of evolution, the accidents of history, the short-sights of the well-intended, and the over-sights of the malignant.

Basically, while the traditional concept of equality is that there is equality in the process, the definition of equality within the cosmological sense is equality in the result. Regardless of whether or not someone is free to achieve their goals, (me train to be a UFC fighter), "if one cannot achieve his goals..." (3) then no equality actually exists. Let me show you why this is faulty logic.

When I graduated from Middle School, we had to take national test to judge our aptitudes. In my math skills, I was rated as having math skills the equivalent of the top 10% of graduating high school students on national testing scales. When I took the ACT and SAT, my math level had dropped down to only being above 55-65% of graduating high school students. Why such a tremendous drop? I suppose I could blame my teachers. I had, in an unending fashion, horrible math teachers throughout high school. I could blame the text books. They were not optimized for learning math in any practical sense. To use the example Thomas Sowell provides:

'A former dean of admissions at Stanford University said that she had never required applicants to submit Achievement Test scores because "requiring such tests could unfairly penalize disadvantaged students in the college admissions process," because such students, "through no fault of their own, often find themselves in high schools that provide inadequate preparation for the Achievement Tests." Through no fault of their own-- one of the recurrent phrases in this kind of argument-- seems to imply that it is the fault of "society" but remedies are sought independently of any empirical evidence that it is.'

However, if I was honest, it was really my fault. There clearly IS a fault of my own at play.

Why was it my fault? First, math bores me to tears. As bad as my teachers were, if I had honestly paid attention and put out any effort, I probably could have improved my scores considerably. Second, I never did any homework which was assigned to me, at best, I might put forth a half-effort to answer the questions to get credit. Third, I had the opportunity to stay after school and work on my math, but I chose not to do so. Fourth, I had friends who were good in math and could have helped me learn how to do math, but I again chose not to do so. Instead, I played football after school in the hopes of getting a date. Fifth, even after all that, I STILL had access to the school library, the public library, and the internet, all of which are FULL of workshops for people needing remedial math. In short, my failure at algebra is not societies fault or burden, it's my fault, and it's still something I can consciously choose to remedy at any time.

Another example Thomas Sowell provides is that:

''When a student in the fourth grade scored higher on the mathematics portion of the Scholastic Aptitude Test than the average high school graduate, it was suggested that he not be taught the usual fourth grade mathematics, but something more appropriate to his ability level. The school's principal, however, flatly refused, saying that it would be "a violation of the principles of social justice" if this boy were taught material above the level of other fourth-graders.'

In short, limiting this young child's capabilities was seen as a form of justice, (or equality, in this sense), but a limitation on that child's freedom to be everything that he potentially could be. The traditional, and in my opinion, correct definition of freedom is best expressed by Hayek: "freedom from coercion, freedom from arbitrary power of men", but not from the restrictions of circumstances. (4). By forcing the child to be under a level of learning beneath him, he was, in effect, not free from the arbitrary power of men.

This ideology can be seen across the board. Ronald Dworkin tells us that he supports affirmative action because someone's race is not under their control, as neither are their intelligence and athletic ability. Likewise, Thomas Nagel repeats the argument of Dworkin, and argues that no one "deserves" to be more intelligent than someone else. Yet everyone, even the authors of the "Bell-Curve" state that intelligence can be changed by study, and constantly call for social reform in the book. Thomas Sowell himself, an erudite man, came from impoverished beginnings in Harlem and probably what would be considered bad genetic stock. Yet his work is pure brilliance. My favorite comeback is from Robert Nozick:

"If the woman who later became my wife rejected another suiter, would the rejected less intelligent and less handsome suitor have a legitimate complaint about unfairness?"

Dr. Michael Aquino writes of this phenom:

"The many unsuccessful individuals tend to resent and envy the few successful ones, and the democratic vote has allowed the demagogues to play upon this dissatisfaction, promising equality of result rather than opportunity. Frequently the actual consequences of such campaigns are aggravating to the elites (who feel constricted and cheated of the fruits of their abilities), and to the masses (who feel humiliated and useless). The elites lose any sense of social responsibility they might have had, and the masses lose their sense of self-reliance; the relationship becomes antagonistic, adversarial, and mutual parasitical." (5)

The overall summary is that people can be faulted for their own short-comings when and if they have the opportunity to change them. American society has done remarkably well at allowing us that opportunity, so that those with less than optimal beginnings like Sowell can become brilliant authors and respected teachers. What the Rawlian theory calls for is the loss of freedom to an idealization of "equality", which is not "justice" in any sense. It is simply a method of complacency, an acknowledgement that the lowest cannot be brought to the level of the highest, so they must bring the mountain to them instead. The optimal goal should be to give those without the opportunity to do so if they desire, not to restrict those who can do so for the sake of others. In Burke's words: "all men have equal rights; but not to equal things." (6) Hayek echoes this with "Equal treatment has nothing to do with the question whether the application of such general rules in a particular situation may lend to results which are more favorable to one group than to others." (7)

We must now ask, "What are the perceivable consequences of these actions?" It's no secret that during the Reagan-era, crime dropped dramatically. Why? Because Reagan, even if sometimes blatantly violating civil rights, believed that people were responsible for what they did, and pursued harsh consequences upon criminals. Socrates said that man is a sorry animal if only the fear of the law is what keeps him in line. Dear Socrates, we are indeed a sorry lot.

Adam Smith saw crime as resulting from something else besides social conditions. He saw boundless examples where if the law were not in place, there would be innumerable natural incentives to cause the people to commit crimes. Thus, punishment of criminals is the only way to ensure the stability of society and the prevention of crime itself, but the humane would resist it because:

"When the guilty is about to suffer that just retaliation, which the natural indignation of mankind tells them is due to his crimes; when the insolence of his injustice is broken and humbled by the terror of his approaching punishment; when he ceases to be an object of fear, with the generous and humane he begins to be an object of pity. The thought of what he is about to suffer extinguishes their resentment for the sufferings of others to which he has given occasion. They are disposed to pardon and forgive him, and to save him from the punishment, which in all their cool hours they had considered as retribution due such crimes. Here, therefore, they have occasion to call to their assistance the consideration of the general interest of society. They counterbalance the impulse of this weak and partial humanity, by the dictates of a humanity that is more generous and comprehensive. They reflect that mercy to the guilty is cruelty to the innocent, and oppose to the emotions of compassion which they feel for a particular person, a more enlarged compassion which they feel for mankind."

What is the result of not holding people accountable for their actions? A decade after academic examinations were abolished in China, the Ministry of Education announced that college entrance examinations "will be restored and admittance based on their results." This was due solely to "the quality of education [has] declined sharply" in the absence of examinations, this lack of accountability had "retarded the development of a whole generation of young people."

Deng Xiaoping complained about "the deterioration of academic standards" and said, "Schools have not paid attention to educational standards and instead overemphasized practical work; students' knowledge of theory and basic skills in their area of specialization has been disregarded." For those in the older generation, you may remember the disaster when this was implemented in American schools and a whole generation lost valuable productive skills.

Currently, the Crusading Cult of Victimology is now telling us, (and appealing to the Supreme Court of the United States) that murderers who score below a certain number on the I.Q. scale should be exempt from the death penalty. These are the same people who told us that I.Q. doesn't actually measure anything, (despite the amazing predictive ability of that test, which even the critic Richard Lewontin had to admit was far beyond what could normally be expected), now they turn around and tell us that I.Q. is a correlative and causitive factor in the scenario of whether or not you will murder someone and can be held accountable for it.

To those who aren't blind, or forgetful of history, (Paul Johnson once remarked that the study of history was the most humbling of all studies, because our arrogant assumptions have been shown to be wrong not once, but dozens of times in dozens of places), the fact that people aren't responsible for their actions is the most dangerous idea of all. This goes into what psychology calls the internal locus of control, and the external locus of control.

The internal locus of control is someone who believes they are in control of their destiny, and that what happens is directly a result of what they do. The external locus of control is that fate, luck, chance, fortune, karma, and so forth, are responsible for how well someone does. Multiple psychological studies have confirmed that ILoC people are much more likely to succeed and prosper versus those who are ELoC. (8)

By granting the premise that people are *not* responsible for their behavior, we have invalidated a psychological aspect of behavior, that humans *need* to feel responsible for their behavior or else they won't *do* anything about their behavior. There's a saying that "ability without ambition is like a car without a motor." I believe that this holds true. Without the intimate belief that you can and do matter, the point in even expending energy becomes moot.

Having established a psychological premise for the basis of holding people accountable for what they do, and by extension, whether or not they are successful, and hence, the absurdity of trying to 'redress grievances', I shall now make a further philosophical argument.

Are humans simply the sum of their physical existence? That is, do humans aspire for more than just to simply exist? Plato, Hegel, and Nietzsche all argued "yes". So did Aristotle, with his famous line from "Metaphysics", All human beings by nature desire to know". Hegel/Nietzsche/Plato had a concept of thymos, that is, humans seek to achieve recognition in what they do as being valid, and that they are good at what they hold to be valid. To want to be good at something is "thymos". To want to be the best at something is "megalothymos". How much thymos can someone who believes they are not responsible for what they do actually have?

The eighteenth century French physiocrat Mercier de la Riviere wrote that : "I admit, however, that the inequalities in the status of man in any given society may have been caused by great disorders which often tend to increase inequalities beyond their natural and necessary proportions. But does this mean that one ought to establish complete equality of conditions? Obviously not, for in order to do so, it would be necessary to destroy all property and consequently society." While I know that there are some, (small/select), reasons that certain can't succeed which is the responsibility of society, I also know that for the most part, it's the Will to Succeed which is more important than the social factors.

I remember a business lecture which went something like this. The speaker was talking about the importance of not quiting, and he said, "Did Thomas Edison ever quit?" The audience said, "No." "Did Abraham Lincoln ever quit?" Again, the audience said "No." The speaker then asked, "Did George Stroman ever quit?" The audience got quit and everyone shot curious looks at each other. Finally, after a pause, someone asked, "Who was George Stroman?" The speaker said, "You mean you never heard of George Stroman?" The audience member said, "Well, no." The speaker shouted back at him, "Well of course you never heard of him! That's because he quit!"

I'm frankly getting sick of everyone whose Mom didn't breast feed them properly complaining that they had to shoot their girlfriend because of childhood trauma. I'm sick of people telling me that they're not responsible for the messes they create. I'm sick of people trying to blame the Universe for their own stupidity. Most of all, I'm sick of the intellectuals who actually know better than that trying to squeeze themselves into the Politically Correct Agenda. You can't blame a dog for barking because it doesn't know any better, but reading people who should be the first to criticize this kind of stupidity deciding to instead write blurbs of praise for indoctrinated ignorance is the most revolting thing I can contemplate. The ball belongs back in the proper court, quit blaming society for problems that aren't its fault.

(This essay is an elaboration of an earlier draft that I wrote).

1.) Milton and Rose Friedman, "Free to Choose", p. 148
2.) Thomas Sowell's "A Conflict of Visions". This essay is greatly indebted to him.
3.) Dahl and Lindblom, "Politics, Economics and Welfare" p. 518.
4.) Hayek, "The Road to Serfdom", pp. 25-26
5.) Aquino, "Church of Satan", p. 55
6.) Burke, "Reflections on the Revolution in France", p. 56
7.) Hayek, "Law, Legislation and Liberty", vol 1., p. 141
8.) Journal of Genetic Psychology, Dec99, Vol. 160 Issue 4, p 436; DuCette, J., & Wolk, S. Locus of control and extreme behavior. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 39, 253-258; Journal of Genetic Psychology, Mar91, Vol. 152 Issue 1, p29, 5p